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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POLICE POWER-DELEGATION OF POWER TO 
PATROL HIGHWAYS To PruvATE CORPORATION-Defendant was stopped for 
speeding in Comstock Township, Michigan, and given a "violation ticket'.' 
by an employee of Charles Services, Inc., a private corporation which 
patrolled the highway under. an arrangement with the township. At the 
trial defendant objected to the admission of evidence establishing him as 
the driver of the speeding vehicle on the ground that it was obtained by 
one not authorized by law to arrest him. On appeal from conviction, held, 
affirmed. Evidence obtained by the employee of Charles Services, Inc., is 
admissible because defendant did not sustain the burden of proving that 
the employee was not a deputy sheriff with proper authority to arrest. 
Further, the objection to evidence on such grounds is proper only on a 
mo#on to suppress in advance of trial. One justice vigorously dissented 
on the ground that delegation of police power is illegal and evidence made 
available as a result of such delegatipn should be suppressed. People v. 
Robinson, 344 Mich. 353, 74 N.W. (2d) 41 (1955). 
The police power is characterized as an inherent attribute of sovereignty 
belonging to the states.1 Because it is part of the state's general welfare 
power, ii should certainly not be abdicated, bargained away or alienated 
111 AM. JUR., C.Onstitutional Law §245 (1937). 
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so that ultimate control by the electorate is lost.2 This argument is fre-
quently advanced when local governments attempt to delegate police 
power.8 In the principal case, the dissenting justice, relying upon the loss 
of control argument, poses the following syllogism: police power is in-
herent and cannot be bargained away; patrol of the highway by the munici-
pality is an exercise of the police power; a delegation granting a corpora-
tion the power to patrol the highways is therefore illegal. However, 
inspection reveals that what is involved in the principal case may not be 
a pure instance of "police power delegation." The police power has been 
defined as the power to enact and enforce laws concerning ~e safety, 
welfare, and morals of the people.4 However, the definition is often re-
stricted to the enactment of such laws.5 Such a restriction seems to be 
an oversight since police power, being inherent with the government as a 
whole, must necessarily include enforcement as well as enactment. It 
does, however, indicate that police power may be separated into two 
categories with enforcement being considered as merely administrative and 
therefore capable of delegation.6 But because the maintenance and opera-
tion of a police force is held to be a governmental function,7 a contradiction 
develops since governmental functions, unlike proprietary functions, can-
not be delegated.8 At the root of this contradiction may be the use of the 
word "delegation." Courts will strike down any attempt by a municipality 
to grant an individual or corporation9 the power to enact laws.10 On the 
other hand, there is no objection to a sheriff appointing a deputy with 
authority and duties regulated by Iawu and who is generally confined to 
ministerial functions.12 This is not a complete delegation but is an ap-. 
2 See, generally, Interurban Ry. and Terminal Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 98 
Ohio St. 287, 120 N.E. 831 (1918); Jones Hollow Ware Co. v. Crane, 134 Md. 103, 106 A. 
274 (1919); Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P. (2d) 615 (1936). 
s 2 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §10.38 et seq. (1949). A state gov-
ernment is allowed to delegate its police power to local governments. See Ex parte Cen-
cinino, 31 Cal. App. 238 at 243, 160 P. 167 (1916). This is usually done by statute. See, 
e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Supp. 1952) §§78.23 (f) (villages), 91.1 (ordinances) (fourth 
class cities), 117.3 (j) (home rule cities). 
4 State v. Riedell, 109 Okla. 35, 233 P. 684 (1925); In re Main, 162 Okla. 65 at 68, 
19 P. (2d) 153 (1933). ' 
Ii 32 WORDS AND PHRASES 743 (1940). 
6 Rockford v. Hey, 366 Ill. 526, 9 N.E. (2d) 317 (1937); Crosbyton v. Texas-New 
Mexico Utilities Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 157 S.W. (2d) 418. 
1 Henry v. Los Angeles, 114 Cal. App. (2d) 603, 250 P. (2d) 643 (1952). 
s State ex rel. Gordon v. Taylor, 149 Ohio St. 427, 79 N.E. (2d) 127 (1948). See, 
generally, Seasongood, "Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or 
Proprietary Test," 22 VA. L. REv. 910 (1936). 
9 See especially: Booth v. Owensboro, 274 Ky. 325, 118 S.W. (2d) 684 (1938). See 
also Middlesboro v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 284 Ky. 833, 146 S.W. (2d) 48 (1940); State 
ex rel. Gordon v. Taylor, note 8 supra; Pippenger v. Mishawaka, 119 Ind. App. 397, 88 
N.E. (2d) 168 (1949); Rockford v. Hey, note 6 supra; Crosbyton v. Texas-New Mexico 
Utilities Co., note 6 supra. 
10 Cf. 92 A.L.R. 400 (1934); 46 A.L.R. 88 (1927). 
11 Gray v. De Bretton, 192 La. 628, 188 S. 722 (1939). 
12 Blake v. Allen, 221 N.C. 445, 20 S.E. (2d) 552 (1942). 
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pointment with the reservation of the power to revoke-a limited delega-
tion.13 A more complete development of the applicable principle would 
be that any delegation of the enforcement aspect of police power must be 
accompanied by effective controls. Under the facts of the principal case, 
there may have been adequate control.14 W'hat should properly disturb 
the dissenting justice, however, is not this mole hill but the mountain 
that may arise from it. A corporation engaged in this type of law enforce-
ment on a county or state basis would be more difficult to control because 
of the lessened concentration of public opinion. The auxiliary enforce-
ment that the municipalities may now draw from the sheriff's department 
or state police force would also be gone.15 Such possible growth of the 
exercise of police power enforcement by private corporations may be 
halted by denying such delegation even at the municipal level. As one 
possible alternative, a group of municipalities could join together to form 
a single police force.16 However, the expense of keeping a sufficient force 
on hand for normal enforcement requirements with the resultant lack of 
an effective force at peak periods of the day would still make the corporate 
hiring system attractive to a civic but budget conscious municipality .. But 
if every municipality within the state -should delegate in this manner, 
the control problems would again become acute. These multiple facets 
of the enforcement-delegation problem may be best resolved by the legis-
lative process where all the arguments could receive adequate discussion.17 
Certainly if the dissenting justice's total prohibition is not accepted, his 
warnings should at least point to a policy of hiring corporate enforcement 
agencies ·only if they are limited in scope and confined to the lower levels 
of the government. 
George Kircos 
1s Cf. Chicago v. M. and M. Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264 at 269, 93 N.E. 753 (1911). 
14 Charles D. Spencer, president of Charles Services, Inc., views the function of the 
corporation as a supplementary police force which augments the limited manpower of 
the sheriff's department and the state police. All employees in this type of work are 
special deputy sheriffs of Kalamazoo County. The employees are paid an hourly salary 
out of the hourly rate the corporation receives from ,the municipality. The corporation 
is employed for an average of sixty hours a month in Comstock Township. Its services 
may be rescinded at any time by some of its local government-employers, although in 
Comstock. Township thirty days notice was orally agreed upon. It is conceivable that 
replacements through the sheriff or state police would not be too difficult if necessary. 
Mr. Spencer also states: "I personally feel that we may be affected much more rapidly by 
public opinion because of our conduct than most other law- enforcement officers, because 
we enjoy no civil service status or political term." Letter from Charles D. Spencer, 
President, Charles Services, Inc., March 7, 1956, on file in the offices of the Michigan Law 
Review. 
15 This statement assumes private corporate police facilities would entirely replace 
existing state and county facilities, rather than supplementing them. 
16 See, e.g.: Mo. CoNsr., art. 6, §16; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §41.201. 
17 See Fla. Gen. Laws (1955) c. 29668. This statute allows arrests for suspicion of 
petty larceny, a misdemeanor, to be made by a store merchant or his employee without 
criminal or civil liability. 
